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POST-COMPLAINT DISCOVERY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS: THE FTC AS A CASE STUDY*
JOEL P. BENNETT**
The FTC's post-complaint discovery rules have been the subject of con-
siderable litigation. In this Article, Mr. Bennett analyzes the problems which
have arisen under the current FTC rules and concludes that the FTC should
adopt the federal discovery rules. As this Article went to press, the FTC cir-
culated for comment new discovery rules which are quite similar to the federal
rules. They are reprinted at 40 Fed. Reg. 1523945 (Apr. 4, 1975).
INTRODUCTION
In these times of increasingly protracted and complex adminis-
trative adjudicatory proceedings,' the proper and efficient use of pre-
trial discovery to develop relevant evidence becomes a critical factor
in minimizing delay both in the pre-trial and trial stages of a pro-
ceeding. It is the purpose of this Article briefly to review -the histo-
rical background of discovery in civil and administrative proceed-
ings, to compare discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure with discovery under the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
Rules of Practice, to examine the evolution of post-complaint2 dis-
* The opinions expressed in this Article represent solely the views of the author.
They are not intended to be, and should not be construed as, representative of official
Federal Trade Commission policy.
** Attorney, Division of Marketing Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. Member, District of Columbia Bar; A.B.
1968, Brown University; J.D. 1972, Georgetown University Law Center.
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
Lewis, Discovery Techniques and the Protection of Confidential Data in FTC Pro-
ceedings, 21 AD. L. REv. 457 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Lewis];
C. WRIGHT & A. MiLLER, FEDnEA. PRACTICE AND PROCnURE (1970) [hereinafter
cited as C. WnRnHT & A. MILLER].
1. E.g., United States v. IBM, No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969)
(pretrial memoranda not filed until Oct. 21, 1974, more than a million documents in-
volved in discovery, 600 witnesses listed for trial) (for a summary of developments in
this case, see 5 TRADE REG. REP. 45,070, at 53,219-20); Exxon Corp., No. 8934
(F.T.C., filed July 18, 1973) (eight respondents, seventeen Commission attorneys as-
signed to the case, FTC counsel's discovery expected to encompass millions of documents
and hundreds of depositions) (for the developments in this case, see 3 TRADE Rro. REP.
20,388, 20,400, 20,527, 20,583, 20,599, 20,675).
2. For those unfamiliar with administrative proceedings, the use of the terms "pre-
complaint" and "post-complaint," as opposed to "pre-trial," in this context may be con-
fusing. The terms are used to differentiate between an agency's discovery in the investi-
gative stage of a proceeding before a determination to issue a complaint is made (pre-
complaint discovery), and the discovery engaged in by all parties once a complaint has
issued and the matter is in the formal adjudicative stage (post-complaint discovery).
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covery under the FTC's rules and the judicial decisions interpreting
those rules, and finally, to evaluate the adequacy of those rules in
light of complex and protracted FTC cases such as the one pres-
ently pending against the eight leading oil companies.3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CIVIL AND AGENCY DISCOVERY
Prior to the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938,4 pre-trial discovery in federal civil proceedings was
quite limited. The pleadings served as virtually the only basis of
preparation for trial under the procedures followed in the federal
courts before the adoption of the new federal rules. Apparently the
philosophy of these earlier procedures was that litigation is partly a
contest of wits and that one contestant should not be compelled to
supply his opponent any information.5 Thus, before 1938, there
was no right to examine opposing parties or witnesses before trial in
actions at law in the federal courts, except for the purpose of pre-
serving proof. Discovery occurred only incidentally to this purpose.6
Only in equity proceedings was discovery allowed, and it was cumber-
some and restrictive.7
Therefore, it is not surprising that the liberal pre-trial discovery
introduced in 1938 was hailed by the Supreme Court as "one of the
most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."8
No longer were parties dependent upon pleadings for issue-formula-
tion and fact-revelation. The function of pleadings was relegated to
that of giving the opposing party notice, while the new rules "[in-
vested] the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the prepara-
tion for trial."9
The discovery devices which the new rules established are depo-
sitions,10 written interrogatories, 1 production of documents and tan-
Compare 16 C.F.R. § 2.1-.35 (1974) (FTC rules for pre-complaint discovery) with
id. H§ 3,1-.72 (FTC rules for post-complaint discovery).
3. Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., filed July 18, 1973).
4. The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme
Court under authority of the Act of June 19,'1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), and became effective on Sept. 16, 1938. Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. App. 7729 (1970). See Rules
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
5. 8 C. WiuoGrr & A. MILLER § 2001, at 14.
6. Id. § 2002, at 21 n.26.
7. Id. § 2002, at 21.
8. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947).
9. Id. at 501.
10. FED. R. Crv. P. 30.
11. FED. R. Cs. P. 33. -
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gible things," physical and mental examinations,'" and requests for
admissions.' 4 Of all these devices, the mightiest weapon in the ar-'
senal may well be the deposition. 5 In federal courts, depositions are
by far the most widely used of the discovery devices. 16
Since their enactment, the rules have been liberalized through
amendment. In 1946, Rule 26 was amended 17 to indicate that the
scope of discovery is not limited to evidence admissible at trial but
also encompasses any relevant inquiry calculated to lead to admis-
sible evidence."8 In 1970, Rule 34 was amended 9 to eliminate the
requirement of a court order and a showing of good cause by the
party seeking the production of documents. This amendment put
an end to needless litigation over the meaning of "good cause." 20
Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a discovery
system designed to operate on the initiative of the parties and, where
possible, without court intervention. In contrast, the discovery pro-
cedures of the federal administrative agencies which engage in civil
litigation2' similar to that conducted under the federal rules are much
more limited22 and often require the direct involvement of the admin-
istrative law judge at each step in the discovery process.23
All federal agencies which conduct civil litigation have the power
to discover facts prior to an adjudicatory hearing through .their power
to conduct investigations. They derive this pre-complaint, investiga-
tory power from their enabling acts.24 But it is the availability of
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
13. FED. R. CIV. P. 35.
14. FED. R. Crv. P. 36.
15. See 8 C. WRIGnT & A. MILLER § 2163, at 486-87.
16. W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DiscovERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYsTEM 52-54 (1968);
8 C. WRiGir & A. MILLER § 2163, at 486-87.
17. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 329 U.S. 839, 854 (1946), amending
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 308 U.S. 694 (1938).
18. See 4 J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MooREs'S FEDERAL PRAcTicE 11 26.56, at 116 (1974).
19. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 398 U.S. 977, 997-98 (1970), amend-
ing Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, 329 U.S. 857 (1946).
20. See 8 C. Wmn-ir & A. MILLER § 2205, at 602-03.
21. The agencies are the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC), the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
22. See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 8.15, at 588 (1958).
23. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
24. Federal Trade Commission Act H8 6(a), 9, 15 U.S.C. H§ 46(a), 49 (1970)
(FTC); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. H8 78u(a)-(b)
(1970) (SEC); Federal Power Act 8H 307(a)-(b), 16 U.S.C. H3 825f(a)-(b) (1970)
(FPC); Labor-Management Relations Act § 11(1), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970)
(NLRB); Federal Communications Act of 1934, §§ 403, 409(b), 47 U.S.C. H§ 403,
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mutual, post-complaint discovery that is the subject of this Article,
and to determine its parameters, the Administrative Procedure Act25
(APA) and the agencies' rules of practice and procedure must be ex.-
amined.
Although the APA does not provide for mandatory post-complaint
discovery, the need for an application of the basic principles under-
lying discovery was recognized in one of -the reports that led to the
enactment of the APA.26 In the APA itself, section 6(c) provides that
"subpenas authorized by law shall be issued to a party on request
and, when required by rules of procedure, on a statement or showing
of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought"; 27
and section 12 makes the evidential and procedural privileges of the
APA applicable -to both agencies and parties.2" The agencies' rules
of practice, however, typically confined the availability of their post-
complaint subpoenas to the actual hearing while allowing their staffs
to use pre-complaint subpoenas for investigation.2 9 This situation
led to a critical examination of discovery in agency adjudication by
various study commissions and commentators in the early 196'sY9
One of the most significant recommendations to come out of all of
this analysis was that of the temporary Administrative Conference of
the United States, which approved in principle the application of dis-
covery rules to federal administrative adjudicatory proceedings.81
Equally significant was the Report of the Conference's Committee on
409(b) (1970) (FCC); Interstate Commerce Act §§ 12, 13, 49 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13 (1970)
(ICC); Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 1002(b), 1004(b), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1482(b),
1484(b) (1970) (CAB).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970).
26. See UTNTrED STATES ATroRNEY GENERAL'S CoMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE FINAL REPORT 64 (1941). By noting that better results would be obtained if the
parties were fully informed before the hearing, the Report recognized the basic argument
in favor of discovery, even though it focused on the use of pre-trial conferences and stip-
ulations.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
28. Id. § 559.
29. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 302.19(a) (1974) (CAB); 17 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1974)
(SEC). See also E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 518-20 (6th Cir. 1944);
Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 1537, 1538 (1960); Standard Motor Prod-
ucts, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 624 (1954).
30. E.g., ADasINrsTRArmn CoNErnmNCE OF THE UNTED STATES, FiN.A REPORT, in
S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Berger, Discovery in Administrative Pro-
ceedings: Why Agencies Should Catch Up With the Courts, 46 A.B.AJ. 74, 75-76
(1960); Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace With Modern Court-De-
veloped Techniques Against Delay?-A Tudge's View, 12 AD. L. REv. 103 (1960).
31. Recommendation No. 30, in S. Doc. No. 24, supra note 30, at 37. For a de-
tailed discussion of the Conferences 1970 recommendations, see Tomlinson, Discovery
in Agency Adjudication, 1971 DuKr L.J. 89.
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Compliance and Enforcement Proceedings urging agencies to adopt
as much of the discovery part of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure as seemed appropriate.32
The recommendation produced responses ranging from adoption
of rules very close to the discovery procedures under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure33 to no change at all.M4 One year before
the Conference's recommendation, the FTC, as part of a general over-
haul of its procedures, substantially liberalized its discovery rules.8"
Yet, even with two subsequent (1963 and 1967) further liberaliza-
tions, the FTC discovery rules are still a long way from the discov-
ery provisions of the federal rules.36
CURRENT FTC POST-COMPLAINT DISCOVERY RULES COMPARED
WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Prior to 1961, trial by interval was the method used by the
FTC in its adjudications; the final record was compiled through a
series of hearings held in various locations at intervals of time.3"
When the change was made to continuous hearings, in which the en-
tire trial was conducted without any substantial interruptions, the parties
needed more extensive post-complaint discovery than had been nec-
essary under the former procedure. 38  This was particularly true of
the respondents, usually businesses, who unlike the FTC had no pre-
32. REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
IN SUPPORT OF RECOMMENDATION 30, in S. Doc. No. 24, supra note 30, at 115. Of
course, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to administrative pro-
ceedings. Ash Grove Cement Co., 77 F.T.C. 1660, 1661 (1970); 1 K. DAVIS, supra
note 22, § 8.15, at 588.
33. The FCC rules closely approximate the federal rules. Compare F.D. R. CIV.
P. 26-37 with 47 C.F.R. H9 1.311-.325 (1974).
34. See Tomlinson, supra note 31, at 90. For a description of the discovery prac-
tices of the NLRB, FTC, CAB, and FPC as of 1966, see Manoli & Joseph, The National
Labor Relations Board and Discovery Procedures, 18 AD. L. Rnv. 9 (Winter-Spring,
1966); Mezines & Parker, Discovery Before the Federal Trade Commission, 18 AD. L.
REv. 55 (Winter-Spring, 1966); Maurer, Use of Discovery Procedures Before the
C.A.B., 18 AD. L. REv. 157 (Winter-Spring, 1966); Ross, Discovery and the Federal
Power Commission, 18 AD. L. REv. 177 (Winter-Spring, 1966).
35. See Tomlinson, supra note 31, at 90.
36. Compare FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37 with 16 C.F.R. H9 3.31-.37 (1974). See Dixon,
Significant New Commission Developments, 23 ABA ANnTRUST SECTION REP. 50, 59
(1963); Lewis 458-60; Mezines & Parker, supra note 34, at 61; Note, Discovery in Fed-
eral Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1051-52 (1964). See also Gell-
horn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission:
Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CmI. L. Rav. 113, 142-46 (1968).
37. See Lewis 457.
38. See L.G. Balfour Co., 62 F.T.C. 1541 (1963); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc.,
57 F.T.C. 1537, 1539 (1960).
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complaint discovery. Thus, the FTC's post-complaint discovery pro-
cedures were born in 1961 as a by-product of the change from trial
by interval to continuous hearings.
Although some provisions of the FTC rules correspond closely to
the federal rules,3 9 there remains a fundamental difference in ap-
proach between FTC discovery and discovery under the federal rules.
Under the federal rules, the party seeking discovery need only file no-
tice of his intent,4" and judicial intervention occurs only if the party
against whom discovery is sought resists. 41  If there is a contest, the
resisting party has the burden of showing good cause why the dis-
covery should not take place.42  Under the FTC rules, however, ap-
plication must be made to the administrative law judge each time a
deposition or subpoena for documents is sought.43  Furthermore, the
party seeking a deposition, either oral or by written interrogatory,
must show that the deposition is necessary for purposes of discovery
and that the information sought could not be obtained by voluntary
methods; 44 a party seeking a subpoena must show the general rele-
vance of the documents and the reasonableness of the scope of the
subpoena.45
In addition to this fundamental difference, there are several spe-
cifics in which the two sets of discovery provisions differ. For ex-
ample, there is no FTC rule which provides for the answering of
written interrogatories directed toward parties who are not natural
persons. The significance of this omission is that FTC depositions
by written interrogatories under FTC Rule 3.33 cannot be addressed
to a party corporation with the requirement that its officer or agent
furnish such information as is available to the corporation. Such in-
formation can be compelled when Federal Rule 33 is in effect.
46
Another area of contrast between the -two sets of rules is that of
sanctions for unjustified failure to comply with lawful discovery re-
quests. Under the federal rules, if the recalcitrant party fails to heed
39. For example, the provisions as to requests for admissions of facts and documents
are quite similar. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 36 with 16 C.F.R. § 3.31 (1974) (FTC
Rule 3.31).
40. Federal Rule 30(b) requires a party desiring to take a deposition to provide no-
tice to every other party to the action. Federal Rule 33 provides for service of inter-
rogatories upon a party. Such service provides notice to the party.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see 8 C. WIGrr & A. MILLER § 2035, at 261.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER § 2035, at 264-66.
43. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.33, 3.34 (1974) (FTC Rules 3.33 and 3.34).
44. Id. § 3.33 (a).
45. Id. § 3.34(b)(1).
46. See FED. R. Crv. P. 33(a).
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the judge's order, that party may have to bear adverse inferences,
the striking of claims or defenses, default judgment, contempt cita-
tions, and/or expenses.17  The FTC rules do not make default judg-
ment and the bearing of expenses express sanctions, although the
administrative law judge is empowered to "take such action . . . as
is just."'48  More important, perhaps, is the fact that these sanctions
are used in federal court proceedings while they do not appear to be
used in FTC proceedings.49
It is apparent that the most significant difference between dis-
covery under the federal rules and under the FTC rules is that under
the latter scheme, the party seeking discovery bears the burden of go-
ing to the administrative law judge for every deposition and subpoena
duces tecum and justifying its issuance. An examination of the lead-
ing cases involving the FTC rules since 1967 will highlight some of
the difficulties of practice under them.
FTC DISCOVERY IN PRACTICE: THE CASE LAW
A number of problems have arisen concerning the interpretation
of the FTC's discovery rules as -they have stood since 1967. One
of the first problems, and one which has taken the Commission seven
years to put to rest, was that of the proper bounds of FTC counsel's
post-complaint discovery in relation to the pre-complaint investiga-
tion. This problem surfaced in All-State Industries, Inc.,"e in which
the Commission quashed the hearing examiner's order permitting the
inspection and copying of an exceedingly broad class of docu-
ments,51 stating that "the [discovery] rules are not intended to pro-
vide for comprehensive post-complaint investigation, but only post-
complaint discovery."5  Respondents have seized upon this language
to attack the use of discovery by FTC counsel on the ground that the
discovery rules are being used as a means of conducting post-com-
plaint investigation.
The Commission could have easily based its decision in All-State
47. ED. R. Civ. P. 37.
48. 16 C.F.R. § 3.38(a) (1974) (FTC Rule 3.38(a)).
49. See 4A J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, supra note 18, 37.03.
50. 72 F.T.C. 1020 (1967).
51. See id. at 1024-25.
52. Id. at 1024 (emphasis added). The Commission's tough stance in All-State may
have been precipitated by the drubbing it took in United States v. Associated Merchan-
dising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), wherein subpoena enforcement was de-
nied in part because of the dragnet approach toward the requested documents. Id. at
556. See also Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59
GEo. L.I. 777, 815-20 (1971).
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on the very terms of FTC Rule 3.34(b)(1), whereby the moving
party has the burden of "showing . . . the reasonableness of the
scope of the subpoena," 3 since the subpoena in question was very
wide-ranging. The Commission's failure to tie its result to that rule
gave respondents an additional, although -tenuous, ground for oppos-
ing FTC counsel's discovery requests. Apparently attempting to limit
the All-State language, the Commission issued a supplemental opin-
ion54 in the case in which it stated that the earlier opinion was not
intended "to change the standards which the Rules of Practice estab-
lish for dealing with applications for discovery""6 and that respond-
ents do not have "the right -to put into litigation the adequacy of the
precomplaint investigation conducted by the Commission or its
staff."10
Nevertheless, the All-State argument has been raised, unsuccess-
fully, in case after case through 19 7 4 .1 7  The Commission, however,
has very recently announced the abandonment of the All-State require-
ment that investigatory work be complete before a complaint is is-
sued. 8 Thus, after seven years of appeals and delays in which no sub-
poena, other than the one in All-State, has been denied on the ground
specified in the All-State opinion, this Pandora's box hopefully has been
closed.
A second issue which has arisen under the present FTC rules is
whether depositions are available only to preserve evidence or for dis-
covery as well. The following language in FTC Rule 3.33(a) has
raised this issue:
Such order [for a deposition] may be entered upon a showing that the
deposition is necessary for purposes of discovery, and that such discovery
could not be accomplished by voluntary methods. Such order [for a
deposition] may also be entered in extraordinary circumstances to pre-
serve relevant evidence upon a showing -that there is substantial reason
to believe that such evidence could not be presented through a witness
at the hearing. . . . [A deposition] should not be ordered to obtain
53. 16 C.F.R. § 3.34(b)(1) (1974).
54. 74 F.T.C. 1591 (1968).
55. Id. at 1592.
56. Id.
57. E.g., FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Food Fair Stores,
Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 20,579 (F.T.C., April 23, 1974); Order Quashing In-
vestigational Subpoena, Exxon Corp., No. 8394 (F.T.C., July 27, 1973).
58. 702 BNA ANiTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-11 (Feb. 25, 1975). This an-
nouncement was foreshadowed by the statement in a recent case that future appeals
predicated on the alleged inadequacy of pre-complaint invesfigation might constitute mis-
use of the appeal process to delay adjudication. See Food Fair Stores, Inc., 3 CCII
TRADE REG. REP. % 20,579 (F.T.C., Apr. 23, 1974).
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evidence from a person relating to matters with regard to which he is
expected to testify at the hearing, or to obtain evidence which there is
reason to believe can be presented at a hearing without the need for
deposition, or to circumvent the orderly presentation of evidence at the
hearing.5 9
On its face, it seems that the rule refers to two kinds of deposi-
tions: those for discovery and those to preserve evidence, 60 and that
the restriction concerning potential witnesses only applies to the lat-
ter kind. However, respondents in two recent cases, General Motors
Corp.61 and The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,62 and a hearing
examiner in an earlier case, Koppers Co.,6 3 have read the rule as
prohibiting the deposing of any person who is expected to testify at
the trial. 64  Fortunately for those who believe in the usefulness of
depositions in FTC practice, respondents' arguments in those two
cases and the hearing examiner's interpretation of FTC Rule 3.33(a)
have been rejected.65
Shortly after FTC Rule 3.33(a) became effective, the hearing
examiner in Koppers, denied respondent's application to take deposi-
tions for discovery in part on the ground that "all persons whose de-
positions are sought are expected to testify ... ."I' On appeal of this
ruling, the Commission noted that the limiting language of FTC Rule
3.33(a) refers only to depositions "to obtain evidence," and distin-
guished depositions "to obtain evidence" from depositions "for pur-
59. 16 C.F.R. § 3.33(a) (1974).
60. Depositions to preserve evidence are also provided for under Federal Rule 27.
61. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Modification of Order Granting Com-
plaint Counsel's Request to Take Depositions of Employees of Respondent General Mo-
tors Corporation for Purposes of Discovery at 16-18, General Motors Corp., No. 8907
(F.T.C., filed June 18, 1973). The General Motors case has been settled. General Mo-
tors Corp., No. 8907 (F.T.C., Jan. 10, 1975).
62. Request for Permission to Appeal at 3-4, 8-9, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co., No. 8916 (F.T.C., filed July 26, 1973). The administrative law judge's decision
has been issued in this case but discovery was not an issue. The Great Atlantic & Pa-
cific Tea Co., No. 8916 (F.T.C., Jan. 24, 1975).
63. See 74 F.T.C. 1571 (1968). The caie involved the alleged monopolization by
Koppers Company of the market for resorcinol.
64. Even one commentator shares this view. See Schniderman, Securing Adequate
Discovery in Administrative Proceedings,:25 AD. L: REv. 167, 171 (1973).
65. Denial of Request for Determination Pursuant to Rule 3.23(b) Permitting Inter-
locutory Appeal in Commission's Discretion at 3, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
No. 8916 (F.T.C.; Aug. 9, 1973-);, Order Denying Respondent's (General Motors Corpo:.
ration's) Motion for Modification of Order- Granting Complaint Counsel's Request to
Take Depositions of Employees of RespondentGeneral Motors Corporation for Purposes
of Discovery at 4, General Motors Corp., No. 8907 (F.T;C., June 22, 1973); Koppers
Co., 74 F.T.C. 1571, 1572-73 (1968).
.. 66. 74 F.T.C at-157l -. . .
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poses of discovery." 7  Thus, the Commission held that FTC Rule
3.33(a) provides for depositions both to preserve evidence and for
purposes of discovery and that a deposition for discovery was not to
be denied merely because the deponent was expected to appear as a
witness. 08
The application of the restriction on depositions to preserve evi-
dence to all depositions, even those requested for discovery purposes
only, would have had the anomalous result of making depositions
unavailable merely because the deponent was expected to testify ai
trial. Each party would then be denied advance knowledge of the
testimony of the other party's witnesses, and effective cross-examina-
tion would be nearly impossible.69 In addition, -the element of sur-
prise would once again become an effective trial weapon. There-
fore, although the wording of FTC Rule 3.33(a) is not free of ambigu-
ity, the Koppers holding was mandated by a common sense view of the
evolving nature of FTC discovery.
Despite the seemingly clear holding in Koppers, respondents in
General Motors and A & P still argued that the restrictions of FTC
Rule 3.33(a) apply to all depositions.70 Administrative Law Judge
Barnes in General Motors correctly identified the depositions sought
as being for discovery and therefore held that the question of whether
deponents were potential witnesses was immaterial. 71  Adminis-
trative Law Judge Hanscom in A & P took a different tack, uphold-
ing FTC counsel's right to depose respondents employees to determine
whether to call them as witnesses. 72  Although both judges clearly
67. Id. at 1572-73. The Commission read the limiting language of FTC Rule
3.33(a) as a logical extension of FTC Rule 3.33(f)(2), which allows the contents of
depositions to constitute evidence only in special cases, see 16 C.F.R. § 3.33(f)(2)
(1974). 74 F.T.C. at 1572-73. Since FrC Rule 3.33(f) (2) prohibits the use of deposi-
tions as evidence when the deponent is able to testify, the Commission reasoned that
the restriction in FTC Rule 3.33(a) was merely meant to prohibit the taking of useless
depositions to preserve evidence. Id.
68. 74 F.T.C. at 1572-73.
69. See id. at 1573. The right to effective cross-examination is embodied in the
APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970). See also Pacific Molasses Co. v. FTC, 356 F.2d
386, 390 n,12 (6th Cir. 1966).
70. See authorities cited in notes 61-62 supra.
71. Order Denying Respondent's (General Motors Corporation's) Motion for Modi-
fication, supra note 65, at 4. Judg6 Barnes wrote, "The fact that one or more of the
proposed deponents may be called to testify in th6 proceeding is not a basis, in and of
itself, to preclude the taking of discovery depositions." Id.
72. Ruling Granting Motion of Complaint Counsel for an Order Authorizing Depo-
sitions of Employees of A & P at 4-5, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., No. 8916
(F.T.C., July 16, 1973). A & P's counsel even went so far as to suggest that Kopperi
applied only to a respondent's constithtional right t6 cross-examine accusers. Request
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reached the correct result, Judge Barnes' reasoning seems preferable
since Judge Hanscom's rationale could conceivably be stretched to al-
low the scattergun technique of deposing everyone who has any con-
nection with the case on the basis that counsel might want to call
them as witnesses." In sum, after considerable uncertainty as to
whether depositions for purposes of discovery were available under
FTC Rule 3.33(a) when the deponent was also a witness,74 such
depositions appear to be here to stay.
A problem related to the FTC Rule 3.33(a) problem in Kop-
pers is that of whether depositions can meet the "necessary" require-
ment of FTC Rule 3.33(a) on the basis that counsel is attempting to
obtain information for the possible contradiction or impeachment of
a witness. 75 This issue arises in two ways in FTC proceedings. First,
counsel for one party may wish to gather information for the possible
impeachment of another party's witness. Second, FTC counsel may
want to gather information for the possible impeachment of his own
witness; impeachment of one's own witness is allowed by FTC Rule
3.41(d) if the witness is an adverse party or an employee of an ad-
verse party.76
The need for testimony to impeach the FTC's own witnesses was
one basis of FTC counsel's ex parte77 deposition motion in General
Motors.78  The administrative law judge noted that given the highly
technical field involved, i.e., automotive engineering, 79 it would be
manifestly unfair to require FTC counsel to call the deponents as
witnesses at trial without an opportunity to prepare for possible hos-
tility or evasiveness on their part.80 General Motors sought modifi-
cation of the order, arguing that the deletion from the 1967 revision
for Permission to Appeal, supra note 62, at 4. This argument was not discussed in the
denial of the request. Denial of Request, supra note 65, at 3.
73. However, this eventuality can be avoided by the "reasonable" requirement of
FTC Rule 3.33.
74. See Gellhorn, supra note 36, at 145-46 n.150.
75. This basis for depositions is recognized under the federal rules. See Broadway
& Ninety-Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew's, 21 F.R.D. 347, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
76. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.41(d) (1974). Federal Rule 43(b) has a comparable provi-
sion.
77. FTC Rule 3.35, 16 C.F.R. § 3.35 (1974), permits such applications.
78. Application for Taking of Depositions for Purposes of Discovery at 2, General
Motors Corp., No. 8907 (F.T.C., filed May 18, 1973).
79. The case involved allegedly unsubstantiated advertising claims concerning the
handling of the Chevrolet Vega and the performance of the lubrication system of the
Buick Opel. Complaint, General Motors Coirp., No. 8907 (F.T.C., filed Dec. 11, 1972).
80. Order Granting Complaint Counsel's Request to Take Depositions of Employees
of Respondent General Motors Corporation for Purposes of Discovery at 4, General
Motors Corp., No. 8907 (F.T.C., May 30, 1973).
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of the Commission's rules of former FTC Rule 3.10(e)(1), s' which
stated that a deposition could be used to contradict or impeach the
testimony of a deponent as a witness, indicated that depositions taken
primarily for impeachment purposes were no longer permissible. s -
FTC counsel, opposing General Motors' motion for modification of
the order, denied that impeachment was the primary purpose of the
depositions but argued that even if it were, such depositions were
permissible under FTC Rule 3.33(a) and that former FTC Rule
3.10(e)(1) was irrelevant because it only applied to the use of de-
positions at trial8s3 When one reads former FTC Rule 3.10(e) (1)
in context with the rest of former FTC Rule 3.10(e), it is apparent
that FTC counsel's argument was correct s' and that the repeal of the
rule has no bearing on the issue of the permissibility of taking depo-
sitions for impeachment. The administrative law judge found it un-
necessary to rule on this precise point, reaffirming his earlier order
allowing the depositions on the ground that the depositions were for
both discovery and impeachment." 5
The issue of the availability of depositions solely for impeach-
ment was raised again in A & P when A & .P moved to have an order
allowing certain depositions certified to the Commission for interlo-
cutory appeal.88 Opposing the motion, FTC counsel argued that the
depositions were proper even assuming arguendo that they had been
requested for impeachment purposes only.8 7  Again the administra-
tive law judge found it unnecessary to address this argument in de-
nying A & P's motion.8"
Although the judges in General Motors and A & P did not base
their rulings on the permissibility of depositions for impeachment pur-
81. 28 Fed. Reg. 7088 (1973).
82. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Modification, supra note 61, at 5.
83. Opposition to Motion for Modification of Order Granting Complaint Counsel's
Request To Take Depositions of Employees of Respondent General Motors Corporation
for Purposes of Discovery at 2-4, General Motors Corp., No. 8907 (F.T.C., filed June
20, 1973).
84. Former FTC Rule 3.10(e) dealt with when a subpoena could "be read in evi-
dence." 28 Fed. Reg. 7088 (1963). Subsection (1) merely allows the introduction for
purposes of impeachment. Id. Subsection (2) allows introduction, inter alia, if the de-
ponent is dead. Id. Thus, it is clear that former FTC Rule 3.10(e) was merely meant
to control the introduction of depositions into evidence, not the taking of depositions.
85. Order Denying Respondent's (General Motors Corporation's) Motion for
Modification, supra note 65, at 3.
86. Request for Permission to Appeal, supra note 62.
87. Answer to Respondent's Application for Review at 8 n.11, The Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., No. 8916 (F.T.C., filed Aug. 6, 1973).
88. Denial of Request, supra note 65. .
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poses, the Koppers opinion strongly indicates that such depositions
are allowable. In Koppers, the Commission ruled in favor of deposi-
tions which were requested, in the Commission's words, "for use in
cross-examination," 89 stressing the crucial nature of effective cross-ex-
aminationY0 Since the need for effective impeachment of an ad-
verse witness can be every bit as important as the right to effective
cross-examination, depositions for impeachment should be treated in
the same manner as depositions for cross-examination., Thus, even
without a direct holding on the precise point, the use of depositions
to gather information for possible impeachment of witnesses, long a
permissible basis for depositions under the federal rules, seems to be
available in FTC practice.
Another important issue raised,9' but not resolved,92 in A & P was
whether the All-State decisions allow post-complaint discovery to be
predicated on post-complaint transactions and occurrences. The com-
plaint in A & P was issued on the basis of two pre-complaint sur-
veys of the availability and prices of advertised items in A & P stores.
93
FTC counsel then moved for authorization to depose seventeen A & P
employees concerning the results of a similar survey taken by the
FTC's Bureau of Economics in spring of 1973, after the complaint
had been issued.94 A & P argued that discovery based on the 1973
survey would violate the policy of the first All-State opinion that
proper post-complaint discovery should, as the Commission stated in
that opinion, "round out, extend, or supply further details for the par-
ticular transactions to be pursued."9  A & P characterized the re-
quested depositions as "a new inquiry into areas unexplored until after
the issuance of the complaint."96
In a short reply brief, FTC counsel reasoned that by labeling
the discovery sought as a "new inquiry into unexplored areas," A & P
89. 74 F.T.C. at 1573.
90. Id.
91. Answer of Respondent to Motion for an Order Authorizing Depositions for
Purposes of Discovery at 7, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., No. 8916 (F.T.C.,
filed Sept. 13, 1973); Reply to Respondent's Answer to Motion for an Order Authorizing
Depositions for Purposes of Discovery at 1-3, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
No. 8916 (F.T.C., filed Sept. 19, 1973).
92. A & P reversed its position at the oral argument on the motion and agreed to
grant voluntary interviews, thus rendering a ruling unnecessary. Record of Pretrial Pro-
ceedings of October 2, 1973, at 65-66, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., No. 8916
(F.T.C.).
93. Answer, supra note 87, at 2.
94. Motion for an Order Authorizing Depositions for Purposes of Discovery, The
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., No. 8916 (F.T.C., filed Aug. 31, 1973).
95. Answer of Respondent, supra note 91, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
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must have been referring to new transactions or occurrences, since
the 1973 survey involved precisely the same subject matter that led
to the issuance of the complaint. 7 FTC counsel next pointed out
that the post-complaint survey clearly could be admitted as evidence,
since FTC Rule 3.15(a)(2) allows pleadings to be amended "at any
time" to allow issues "reasonably within the scope of the original com-
plaint or notice of hearing" to be raised.98  Therefore, it was ar-
gued, the All-State limitation on post-complaint discovery must not
bar discovery predicated upon events known to bear on the subject
matter of the complaint at the time discovery is sought; a contrary
interpretation would lead to the anomalous result that a post-com-
plaint event could be introduced as evidence but could not be the
proper object of discovery.99 Although he was not required to rule on
this issue because A & P agreed to voluntary interviews, the adminis-
trative law judge indicated that he was willing to allow the deposi-
tions, 00 suggesting that he may well have agreed with FTC counsel's
position.
FTC counsel's argument in A & P seems well-reasoned and cor-
rect in its conclusion that discovery predicated upon post-complaint
transactions is not precluded by the All-State decisions. In addition
to FTC counsel's argument that FTC Rule 3.15(b) compels re-
jection of the requirement that post-complaint discovery always be
linked to the pre-complaint investigation, such a linkage require-
ment must also be rejected as having no basis in the All-State lan-
guage and as being contrary to the logic of the FTC rules and
practice.
In All-State, the Commission was presented with a situation in
which discovery was predicated upon both pre-complaint and post-
complaint events. 1' 1 However, the Commission showed no concern
for this pre-complaint-post-complaint dichotomy. Rather, it de-
fined a proper post-complaint discovery order as one "aimed at ob-
taining information not ordinarily obtainable before issuance of the
complaint, additional details, or an extension of information as to
disclosed transactions or events for which evidence is to be adduced
97. Reply, supra note 91, at 1-2.
98. 16 C.F.R. § 3.15(a)(2) (1974). FTC Rule 3.15(b) permits the administrative
law judge, "upon reasonable notice and such terms as are just," to allow service of a
supplemental pleading or notice of post-complaint events which are relevant to any of
the issues involved.
99. Reply, supra note 91, at 3.
100. Record of Pretrial Proceedings, supra note 92, at 66.
101. 72 F.T.C. at 1024-25.
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in support of the complaint . *.". ."" Thus, the All-State decisions
clearly require only that the transaction or event upon which post-
complaint discovery is predicated be a potential evidentiary item in
the proceeding, regardless of whether the event was pre- or post-com-
plaint. This requirement obviously does not limit post-complaint dis-
covery to those transactions or events uncovered in the pre-com-
plaint investigation.
Moreover, demanding a linkage between post-complaint discov-
ery and pre-complaint investigation would result in an illogical, unwork-
able rule. If, for example, the Commission received a consumer com-
plaint alleging a transaction identical to ones alleged in a pending ad-
judicatory matter, FTC counsel could not conduct any necessary addi-
tional discovery, such as subpoenaing the respondent company's records
as to the alleged transaction. Such a result might encourage respond-
ents to continue allegedly illegal activies after a complaint has been
issued.
In view of the foregoing arguments, it seems that discovery pred-
icated upon post-complaint events is well-founded and will be per-
mitted when those events may be evidentiary items in -the proceeding.
Any other result would be contrary to the basic spirit of modem fed-
eral discovery and the evolving liberalization of FTC discovery.
Having reviewed the major issues which have arisen in litiga-
tion over the FTC's discovery rules, it is appropriate to turn to an
analysis of the effectiveness of those rules.
FTC DISCOVERY RULEs: SuccEss OR FAILURE?
While the FTC's discovery rules have generally received a lib-
eral interpretation from the Commission, the question still must be
asked whether those rules have been successful in practice. One
strong indication that the current rules are in fact inadequate is that
FTC counsel in Exxon Corp.,103 a case in which the eight largest
petroleum companies have been charged with conspiracy to fix prices
and to restrain competition,0 4 moved to have the discovery pro-
visions of the federal rules substituted for the FTC discovery rules
in that case.'0 5 In the alternative, FTC counsel sought a
ruling that the depositions requested by any party under Section 3.33
of the Rules of Practice are "necessary for the purposes of discovery"
102. Id. at 1023-24 (emphasis added).
103. No. 8934 (F.T.C., filed July 18, 1973).
104. See Complaint, Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., filed July 18, 1973).
105. Motion of Complaint Counsel for Major Integrated Procedural Relief at 1, Ex-
xon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., filed Oct. 18, 1974).
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in this action, and that the "voluntary methods" requirement of Section
3.33 is met by the attempt to secure the voluntary appearance of a wit-
ness for deposition, and that all other provisions of the Rules of Prac-
tice be interpreted in a manner consistent with the policies of thorough
and expeditious discovery as exemplified by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure .... 106
In denying the motion, the Commission stated that it "does not
favor tailoring special rules for individual cases" but noted that revi-
sions of the FTC discovery rules would soon be promulgated.'07
The motion once again raised the issue of whether -the dis-
covery provisions of the federal rules should be adopted for FTC
proceedings, an issue which has provoked reaction both pro and con
in the past. 108 The basic argument in favor of replacing the cur-
rent FTC rules with the federal rules is the delay endemic to a discov-
ery system where the party seeking discovery must first seek to ac-
complish that discovery by voluntary means and then, if unable to
gain the information voluntarily, to seek compulsory process by mak-
ing the affirmative showing of necessity under FTC Rule 3.33(a) for
depositions or of general relevancy and reasonableness under FTC
Rule 3.34(b) for subpoenas duces tecum. At that point the matter
often is fully litigated with briefs, and the administrative law judge,
perhaps after holding oral argument, issues a ruling. If the rul-
ing is favorable to the moving party, then and only then can discov-
ery take place.' 09
This process can easily take months every time discovery is
sought. While such inherent delay is of itself unsatisfactory, it also
has the undesirable effect of forcing the parties to rely more heavily
on accomplishing discovery by voluntary methods. Because of the
absence of any sanctions against the person who fails to keep inter-
view appointments, answer questions directly, or produce documents,
106. Id.
107. Order Denying Motion for Major Integrated Procedural Relief at 1, Exxon
Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C., March 4, 1975).
108. Pro: 1 K. DAvis, supra note 22, § 8.15, at 589. See also Kintner, Discovery
in Administrative Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 AD. L. REv. 233 (1964); Tomlinson, su-
pra note 31; Symposium, The Role of Discovery in Federal Trade Commission Proceed-
ings, 21 AD. L. REv. 439 (1969).
Con: Lewis 458; cf. Note, supra note 36.
109. In A & P, respondents opposition to two sets of voluntary interviews with its
employees resulted in depositions or interviews being taken up to four months after they
were originally proposed to be scheduled. FTC counsel originally requested the inter-
views by a letter dated August 10, 1973. Motion for an Order, supra note 94, app. A.
A & P did not agree to the interviews until October 2, 1973. Record of Pretrial Proceed-
ings, supra note 92, at 65-66.
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voluntary methods are a wholly inadequate substitute for the com-
pulsory processes of deposition, interrogatory, and subpoena duces
tecum. In fact, a respectable argument can be made that a lawyer
has an ethical obligation not to make full disclosure unless under com-
pulsory process." 0
Those who oppose adoption of the discovery provisions of the
federal rules in FTC proceedings point with horror to the expense
and delay which they foresee would result from the greater liberality
of the federal rules."' The basis of their fear is that, freed from the
necessity of making the affirmative showings required by the current
FTC rules, the parties would unduly delay the proceedings by engag-
ing in much expensive and useless discovery. However, the delays
which have occurred under the current FTC rules in the Exxon"12 and
A & P"-3 litigations and the large number of interlocutory appeals on
discovery issues since 1967"1 make it unlikely that adoption of the
federal rules would cause any more delay than already exists. In
addition, a switch to the federal rules would eliminate the litigation
over whether the party seeking discovery has exhausted the volun-
tary measures and whether the affirmative showings required by FTC
Rules 3.33(a) and 3.34(b) have been made. The large body of
law interpreting the federal rules and attorneys' familiarity with those
rules would also minimize delay.
Furthermore, the expense and delay created by post-complaint
discovery can be minimized if the case is handled properly by the ad-
ministrative law judge from the outset. The Manual for Complex
Litigation"5 can be used to define the issues at an early pre-trial con-
ference and to confine discovery within the boundaries set by the de-
fined issues. If this is done effectively, the benefits of the federal
rules' party-oriented discovery approach, whereby the judge is in-
volved only as a last resort, can be realized while minimizing the
risk that the parties will abuse the discovery procedures and delay the
litigation by inquiring into issues only tangentially related to the case.
Of course, when a case like United States v. International Business
Machines Corp.,"' an antitrust case which involved over a million
documents in discovery, or Exxon comes along, the amount of dis-
110. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19, EC 7-27 (1969).
111. See Lewis 458-59; Mezines & Parker, supra note 34, at 60.
112. See Motion of Complaint Counsel, supra note 105, at 2-3.
113. See note 109 supra.
114. See Lewis 458.
115. COMMFRCE CLEARING HOUSE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEx LrIiGA-noN (1973).
116. No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969).
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covery and the length of the pre-trial periods are going to be enor-
mous under any set of rules consistent with due process. But in the
run-of-the-mill case, FTC or otherwise, post-complaint discovery un-
der the federal rules is unlikely to result in undue delay or expense,
especially if the issues have been properly narrowed.11 7
CONCLUSION
Since 1961, the FTC has made great strides in liberalizing its
discovery procedure. There has, however, been a large amount of
time-consuming litigation since 1967 over the meaning of the dis-
covery provisions of the FTC Rules of Practice. Moreover, the fact
that the current FTC rules make every requested deposition and sub-
poena the likely object of litigation has resulted in many preliminary
delays and interlocutory appeals of discovery orders. These factors
mitigate heavily in favor of the adoption by the FTC of the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it is to be
hoped that the new discovery rules forthcoming from the FTC will
closely track the federal rules.
117. See W. GLAsmt, supra note 16, at 177.
[Vol. 1975:329
